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NEW YORK TIMES  
21 DECEMBER 1978

## Brzezinski Is Said to Have Rejected Warnings About Problems in Iran

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 — Responding to White House complaints about an intelligence failure in Iran this summer and fall, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials are charging that key Presidential aides refused to accept any criticism of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.

At the root of the debate over who is to blame for the surprise over the sudden weakening of the Shah's regime is a policy that emerged in the mid-1960's forbidding both the State Department and the C.I.A. from making contact with Iranian opposition movements. The ban started, intelligence officials have disclosed, after the Shah began to express anxiety about such contacts.

In a series of recent interviews, however, State Department and intelligence officials said that the lack of first-hand information was only one reason for the Administration's seeming inability to quickly perceive the extent of the discontent in Iran when the current wave of demonstrations and violence began in Teheran early last month.

### Problems Due to Arms Purchases

Another element, these sources said, was the refusal earlier this year of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, and other high-level officials to deal with the State Department's analyses and critiques suggesting that the Shah was facing growing military, social and economic problems because of his multibillion-dollar program of arms purchases.

In late spring, the sources said, Mr. Brzezinski, with the support of other senior Administration officials, refused to permit a State Department review of potential Iranian problems to be placed on the agenda for a Cabinet-level meeting on a package of proposed arms sales to the Shah.

Experts in the State Department and C.I.A. said they had agreed to talk openly about intelligence activities in Iran because they were angry and concerned that the White House was seeking to make the intelligence agency a scapegoat, a word used by a number of officials, by suggesting that it had failed to warn President Carter adequately about last month's demonstrations in Iran.

### Ordered to Concentrate on Soviet

One well-informed C.I.A. official said that the agency's many clandestine operatives in Iran had been ordered to concentrate on obtaining intelligence

about the Soviet Union, which shares a long border with Iran, particularly in the 1960's after the Shah expressed suspicions that some American agents had established liaison with opposition groups. The official said, "For more than 10 years we've been unable to penetrate the domestic opposition in Iran — it's been a no-no."

A State Department official explained that the department's policy was that "You don't talk to the opposition."

"It may not have been written down," he added, "but it was a conscious policy."

He and other officials told of two highly regarded Foreign Service officers who they said disregarded that policy in recent years and tried to obtain first-hand information on anti-Government movements. Both men, they said, received official reprimands and were summarily transferred from Iran, with devastating impact on their careers.

As the protests grew in volume and intensity last year and into the spring, C.I.A. officials said, Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, continued to forbid any reporting on dissidents out of fear that the agency's activities would be discovered by Savak, the Shah's secret police.

Admiral Turner was quoted by an associate as justifying his refusal to gather information on anti-Government forces in Iran on the grounds that "the chances of Savak finding out about it were 99 percent."

"And that would have led to an international incident," the associate was quoted as saying.

Intelligence sources later explained that the C.I.A. has relied extensively on Savak for reporting on anti-Shah dissent among the religious, professional and student groups that were considered more moderate. The intelligence agency helped train and establish Savak in the late 1950's and played a role in its operations over the next few years, the officials explained, to help it neutralize the outlawed Communist Party in Iran.

### Ban on Contacts Lifted

Only since the unrest intensified in recent weeks has the virtual ban on contacts with opposition groups been lifted, it was said, and many experts on Iran in the C.I.A. and State Department have been sent to Teheran to improve the reporting by the American Embassy. A ban was still in effect as of last week, the official said, on contacts with dissident Iranians outside Iran.

In interviews, the intelligence officials and others singled out Mr. Brzezinski as having sought to lead an attack on the agency and Admiral Turner.

Hostility to Mr. Brzezinski was repeatedly expressed by State Department officials involved in arms sales and Iranian affairs. These middle-level officials made clear in interviews that they were bitterly opposed, some to a degree not equaled since the Vietnam War, to the Administration's handling of the crisis.

Within the intelligence community it is widely believed that Mr. Brzezinski played a key role last month in making public a note, handwritten by President Carter, that expressed dissatisfaction with "the quality of political intelligence." Although the President's message was directed to Mr. Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance as well as Admiral Turner, it reportedly had been aimed at the C.I.A.

One senior intelligence official complained that Mr. Brzezinski apparently had the President convinced that the failure to predict the events in Iran was largely the result of the cutback, widely criticized at the time, of 800 C.I.A. operatives that was ordered by Admiral Turner in early 1977. In fact, the C.I.A. official said, only a few of those 800 positions were overseas.

### Too Much Electronic Data

Mr. Brzezinski is known to have recently expressed concern that the C.I.A. has been ignoring data that operatives have collected, data known as "humint," for "human intelligence," and placing too much emphasis in its analyses on information collected by electronic and technical means.

The C.I.A. official also complained that the White House and Mr. Brzezinski had been instrumental in circulating stories suggesting that the C.I.A. had just concluded an optimistic intelligence estimate on Iran when the rioting against the Shah broke out anew in Teheran in early November. That estimate was said to have contended that the Shah faced no significant internal threat.

In fact, the C.I.A. official said, such an estimate did exist, but it had been withdrawn from circulation in the intelligence community and canceled by Admiral Turner in September, after objections were raised by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence.

Other sources said that the first sentence of the estimate, as circulated in August, said in effect: "The Shah, who firmly holds the reins of power, will preside over a peaceful and prosperous Iran for the next 10 or 15 years." Since early spring, protests and violent demonstrations in Iran have been growing in intensity.

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